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Abstract The self-presentational behaviour of 43 6- to
12-year-old children with high functioning autism spec-
trum disorders (HFASD) and normal intelligence and 43
matched comparisons was investigated. Children were
prompted to describe themselves twice, first in a baseline
condition and then in a condition where they were asked to
convince others to select them for a desirable activity (self-
promotion). Even after controlling for theory of mind
skills, children with HFASD used fewer positive self-
statements at baseline, and were less goal-directed during
self-promotion than comparison children. Children with
HFASD alter their self-presentation when seeking personal
gain, but do this less strategically and convincingly than
typically-developing children.
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Introduction
Being concerned about how one appears to others is con-
sidered typical or even axiomatic human behaviour
(Schlenker and Weigold 1992). The active manipulation of
the impressions we leave on others, by selecting specific
behaviours to convey a particular image to an audience, is
referred to as self-presentation (Goffman 1959). Children
with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are notably poor
mindreaders (Yirmiya et al. 1998). However, it is unclear
whether this limitation entails that they cannot strategically
shape other people’s perceptions of them.
Typically-developing children come to understand that
they can manipulate another person’s perception of them-
selves at around 6 years of age (Harris 1989). From around
8 years, self-presentational motives become increasingly
salient (Banerjee 2002) and children increasingly adapt
self-presentational strategies to specific goals. For instance,
10-year-old children emphasised more assets that were
relevant to a desirable goal than 6-year-olds (Aloise-Young
1993).
Children with ASD seem less concerned about others’
feelings or others’ perspective on themselves and hardly
show self-conscious emotions, such as embarrassment and
shame (Frith and Happe 1999; Hobson et al. 2006). How-
ever, they do recognize that an audience can cause
embarrassment in others (Hillier and Allinson 2002), and
have a surprisingly adept, though slightly less positive self-
concept (Bauminger et al. 2004; Lee and Hobson 1998). It
could be argued that they acknowledge the interpersonal
principle of self-presentation, but need triggers to increase
their concern and apply these principles in their own
interactions with others.
In the present study we varied the motivation for posi-
tive self-presentation by manipulating a personal gain that
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could potentially be attained by strategic choice of self-
descriptions, following Aloise-Young (1993). Since chil-
dren with high functioning ASD (HFASD) are sensitive to
such manipulations (Begeer et al. 2003, 2006), we expec-
ted them to report fewer positive self-statements in baseline
self-descriptions but to increase their positive self-state-
ments and effective self-presentation strategies in a self-
promotion condition.
Methods
Participants
Forty-three children with HFASD participated (39 boys, 4
girls), including 26 children with PDD-NOS and 17 chil-
dren with autism or Asperger syndrome. The diagnostic
classification was based on the assessment by a child
psychiatrist and multiple informants (psychologists and
educationalists) who observed and tested the children in the
group and in school during a period of at least 3 months.
The children fulfilled established diagnostic criteria
according to the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric
Association 2000). The comparison group included 43
typically-developing children (39 boys, 4 girls), individu-
ally matched on chronological and mental age with the
HFASD group. Participants’ first language was Dutch.
They were tested in a familiar setting within their school.
Consent for participation was obtained from parents and
head teachers.
A short version of the Dutch Revised Wechsler Intelli-
gence Scale for Children (WISC-R; Van Haasen et al.
1986) was administered to estimate FSIQ, VIQ and PIQ.
Independent samples t-tests did not detect differences
between individuals with HFASD and comparison partic-
ipants on chronological age, VIQ, PIQ or FSIQ (see
Table 1).
Materials
Self-Presentation Task: Baseline and Self-Promotion
Self-Descriptions
To elicit base-line self-descriptions the child was told:
‘Imagine a film crew will come to your school. They want
to interview children and you’re being interviewed as well.
They want to know what kind of children go to this school.
They ask you to tell them what kind of boy/girl you are.
What would you tell them?’
To elicit self-promotion self-descriptions, the child was
asked a more specific question, where a personal goal was
introduced. The child was told: ‘Imagine the film crew then
tells you that they will choose one child that can participate
in a game with lots of prizes to be won. The crew is going
to film you. You can tell them why they should let you
participate in the game with the prizes. What would you
tell them?’
Theory of Mind Task
A second-order false-belief task, derived from Sullivan
et al. (1994), involved a story about a mother and her child.
A series of probe and control questions was asked to ensure
that the child was following the story. After each probe or
control question was answered, feedback or correction was
provided to the child. Finally, the second-order false-belief
question was asked, and the child was prompted to justify
his/her response.
Procedure
All tests were presented orally by one of the investigators
in a quiet room. The tasks were part of a larger battery of
tests that are not reported here. The tasks were adminis-
tered in counterbalanced order. The total duration of the
session was 45 min. The intelligence test was administered
on another occasion, approximately 2 weeks later.
Coding
Self-Presentation
Both the baseline and self-promotion responses were tape-
recorded and transcribed. The mean numbers of words per
self-description was calculated. Self-statements were
defined as self-referring sentences, i.e. they had ‘I’ as their
grammatical subject. Following Aloise-Young, each self-
statement contained in the transcript was coded for valence
(positive, negative or neutral). The positive category
included expressions of positive affect (like, love, enjoy),
abilities (smart, good at something) and socially desirable
Table 1 Details of the participants
CA (years;months) VIQ PIQ FSIQ
HFASD (N = 43)
Mean 9;7 105 103 104
SD 1;7 16.9 16.2 15.1
Range 6;5–13;2 76–147 76–152 83–152
Comparison (N = 43)
Mean 9;6 106 107 105
SD 1;6 17.9 16.8 13.0
Range 6;8–12;7 71–152 63–152 80–130
HFASD high functioning autism spectrum disorders, CA chronolog-
ical age, VIQ verbal IQ, PIQ performal IQ, FSIQ full scale IQ, SD
standard deviation
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attributes (being nice, helpful). The numbers of positive,
neutral and negative self-statements were tallied for each
child.
In the self-promotion condition we additionally scored
attempts of children to present themselves positively in
relation to the personal gain that could be achieved (i.e.
participating in the game where desirable prizes could be
won). Specifically, all positive self-statements were coded
as game-related (relevant skills, motivation to win) or not-
game related (all other responses).
Theory of Mind Task
Children were scored as passing the second-order false-
belief task when they showed explicit or implicit second-
order reasoning including an appropriate justification using
the taxonomy of Sullivan et al. (1994).
A second rater, a graduate student blind to the diagnosis
of the children, rated 20 transcripts. Inter-rater reliability
(Cohen’s Kappa) was 0.95 for positive self-statements,
0.95 for the goal-directedness of the positive self-state-
ments and 0.99 for the second-order false-belief task.
Results
Report Rate and Length
Responses of children with PDD-NOS and HFA were not
significantly different, and therefore were combined in the
analyses. Three comparison children and seven children
with HFASD reported not to know at all how they would
describe themselves. The frequency of these non-responses
did not differ between HFASD children and comparisons
(v2 = 1.81, p [ 0.05).
Equal numbers of words were used by children with
HFASD (M = 59.7, SD = 39.7) and comparisons (M =
56.0, SD = 34.3), F(1, 84) = 0.43, ns, and there were no
significant differences between the baseline and self-
promotion conditions within the autism group (M = 32.1,
SD = 26.3 and M = 27.6, SD = 20.4, respectively;
F \ 1) or the typically developing group (M = 29.6,
SD = 19.0 and M = 24.8, SD = 22.0, respectively;
F \ 1).
Valence of Self-Statements
Table 2 shows the valence of the self-statements for the
baseline and self-promotion condition. A 2 (Group:
HFASD and comparison) 9 2 (Condition: baseline and
self-promotion) 9 3 (Valence: positive, neutral and nega-
tive) analysis of variance indicated no main effect for
Group, F(1, 84) = 0.00, p [ 0.05. A main effect was
found for Condition, F(1, 84) = 23.18, p \ 0.01, indicat-
ing that the overall mean number of self-statements was
lower in the self-promotion condition than in the baseline
condition. Furthermore, effects were found for Valence,
F(2, 168) = 62.23, p \ 0.001, Group 9 Valence, F(2,
168) = 7.25, p \ 0.001, Condition 9 Valence, F(1,
84) = 15.39, p \ 0.001 and Group 9 Valence 9 Condi-
tion, F(2, 168) = 3.52, p \ 0.05.
To elucidate the nature of the critical three-way inter-
action, we tested the simple effect of Group 9 Valence
within each Condition. The simple effect of Group 9
Valence was significant for the baseline condition, F(2,
168) = 8.40, p \ 0.001, but not for the self-promotion
condition, F \ 1. The contrast between results for the
different conditions is due to the fact that the HFASD
children provided significantly fewer positive self-state-
ments [t(84) = 2.99, p \ 0.01] and significantly more
neutral self-statements [t(84) = 2.17, p \ 0.05] than the
comparison group in the baseline condition, representing
medium sized effects (r = 0.31 and 0.21, respectively). No
significant group differences were observed in the self-
promotion condition (all ps [ 0.10).
Furthermore, paired analyses within both groups showed
that the number of positive self-statements increased in the
HFASD group, t(42) = 1.95, p \ 0.06, r = 0.29, but not
in the typically developing group t(42) = 1.21, ns,
r = 0.18. Given the absence of group differences in the
self-promotion condition, as noted above, these results
indicate that the experimental manipulation brought the
number of positive self-statements of the HFASD group in
line with that of the comparison group.
Table 2 Mean values (SD) of positive, neutral, negative and other self-descriptions in both conditions (range: 0–?)
Group Total Positive Neutral Negative
Base-line condition Comparisona 4.18 (2.22) 1.84 (1.68) 1.58 (1.37) 0.19 (0.45)
HFASDa 3.30 (2.24) 0.88 (1.26) 2.26 (1.71) 0.16 (0.43)
Self-promotion condition Comparisona 2.61 (1.38) 1.49 (1.33) 0.61 (0.82) 0.02 (0.15)
HFASDa 2.56 (1.76) 1.44 (1.52) 0.93 (1.08) 0.07 (0.26)
a n = 43
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Goal-Directedness of Positive Self-Statements
During Self-Promotion
As noted earlier, positive self-statements in the self-pro-
motion condition were further categorized according to
their goal-directedness as game related or not-game-related
(Table 3). A 2 (Group: comparison and HFASD) 9 2
(Goal-directedness: game-related and not-game-related)
MANOVA showed no main effects for Group or Goal-
directedness but an interaction effect was found for
Group 9 Goal-directedness, F(1, 84) = 6.72, p \ 0.05.
Although children with HFASD did sometimes report
game-related features, they did so less often than typically
developing children t(84) = 2.17, p \ 0.05. r = 0.23.
Furthermore, it was of particular interest to see that
children with HFASD included very similar numbers of
game-related and not-game-related self-statements in the
self-promotion condition, t(42) = 0.72, ns, whereas com-
parison children seemed to focus specifically on game-
related features t(42) = 3.36, p \ 0.005, r = 0.46.
In addition to being matched on age and IQ, children
with HFASD and comparisons performed similarly on the
second order false belief task (percentage passing, 0.58 vs.
0.72, respectively), v2(1) = 1.84, p [ 0.10. Correspond-
ingly, when age, IQ and false belief performance were
included as covariates, the key findings regarding the
valence and the goal-directedness of children’s self-state-
ments remained the same (three-way interaction of
Condition 9 Group 9 Valence, F(2, 162) = 4.93,
p \ 0.01; two-way interaction of Group 9 Goal-directed-
ness, F(1, 81) = 9.45, p \ 0.005). Moreover, in both the
HFASD and the comparison group correlations between IQ
scores and any of the dependent variables were absent.
Discussion
The current study confirmed that children with HFASD
may understand the basic principle of self-presentation, but
also showed where they failed strategically. Personal gain
triggered their self-presentational behaviour, as evidenced
by their higher report of positive self-statements and their
reference to some game-related features in the self-pro-
motion condition. These findings indicate that they can
shape the image they present to their audience, even though
they need to be explicitly motivated to do so.
However, there were clear differences in the self-pre-
sentational behaviour of the HFASD and comparison
groups. In the baseline condition, with no explicit personal
gain to be achieved, the HFASD children did not exhibit
the typically-developing children’s tendency to give posi-
tive self-statements. Moreover, despite the higher number
of positive self-statements in the self-promotion condition,
their self-descriptions here still included many obvious
(e.g. ‘I really want to win prizes’), irrelevant (e.g. ‘I can
count to 10 in Russian’) or even negative (e.g. ‘I get angry
very quickly’) self-statements. Thus, they seemed less
attuned to what their audience might want to hear in order
to pick them for the game. Their responses were mostly
characterized by a naı¨ve generality, with little strategic
attempt to single themselves out from the rest of the par-
ticipants. In contrast, comparison children showed a clear
tendency to focus on the self-presentational goal at hand:
the majority of their self-promotion statements were game-
related.
We have to note several limitations of the current study.
First, the baseline and self-promotion conditions were
presented in a fixed order, which may have influenced
children’s responses. A future design would benefit from
counterbalancing or an entirely between-subjects design in
order to show conclusively that differences between con-
ditions in positive and strategic statements are independent
of practice. Second, the current experiment called for the
use of pretence abilities, because children had to imagine
how they would respond in an hypothetical situation. Pre-
tence abilities likely play an important role during strategic
self-presentation, since children have to imagine the per-
spective of another person in order to adapt their strategy.
However, the current study could have used a more direct
method by simply asking children to describe themselves
to the experimenter, with or without a possible personal
gain. Third, it could be argued that the value of partici-
pating in a game with prizes is not as compelling to
children with HFASD as it is for typically developing
children. It may have been useful to include a measure of
the perceived value of the personal gain that could be
obtained in the self-promotion condition. However, a clear
interest of the HFASD children in the currently employed
prize-winning game may still be concluded from the
increase in positive self-statements from the baseline to the
self-promotion condition. Furthermore, the observed
results are consistent with other evidence that anticipated
rewards are highly valued by HFASD children (Begeer
et al. 2003).
Clinical interventions often focus on enhancing the
social knowledge of children with HFASD (Lord et al.
2005). However, the current findings suggest that even
Table 3 Goal directedness of positive self-statements in the self-
promotion condition (range: 0–?)
Group Game related Not game related
Comparisona 1.07 (1.08) 0.41 (0.73)
HFASDa 0.63 (0.78) 0.81 (1.40)
a n = 43
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adequate social knowledge, in domains such as false belief
or self-presentation, often fails to translate into more subtle
adaptive self-presentational behaviour. This is in line with
mounting evidence of limitations in the application of
social understanding in children with HFASD, and under-
lines the importance of interventions that focus on adaptive
behaviour (Klin et al. 2007).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
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